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Discrimination in Housing and 
Labor Markets: Three Essays 
Caitlin Knowles Myers 
Nearly 50 years after the peak ofthe Civil Rights 
movement, inequality persists in American society. 
However, while the existence of racial and gender 
differentials is generally well known, and the act 
of observing and measuring these differentials is 
straightforward, their source remains more elusive. 
Although the three essays that comprise this dissertation 
focus on different markets and use different data, they are 
all united in an attempt to more thoroughly understand 
the magnitude and source of inequality in our society. The 
first essay uses self-collected data from local television 
news stations to explore a new theoretical model affirm 
differentiation in response to customer discrimination. 
The second uses panel data for spatial clusters of homes 
to examine the interplay of neighborhood characteristics, 
household race, and housing prices. The third essay 
uses the repeal of state-sponsored affirmative action in 
California as a natural experiment for measuring the 
impact of removing affirmative action. 
As a whole, the essays in this dissertation highlight 
the importance of taking into account not only direct 
discriminatory behavior, but also the more subtle forces 
of preference and prejudice. In the local news market, 
although customers themselves are not forcing firms to 
segregate, it is their preferences that drive that outcome. 
In housing markets it is the prejudices of neighbors 
that cause housing prices to fall following an influx of 
blacks, although these neighbors themselves are not 
taking money out of anybody's hands. Yet when looking 
at affirmative action, 25 years of state policy aimed at 
changing preferences and prejudices evidently has not 
had the desired impact. These essays sound a cautionary 
note for government. Even if we could effectively 
eliminate supplier discrimination in housing or employer 
discrimination in labor markets, the preferences of 
demanders could continue to drive inequality. 
I now turn to a brief overview of each of the essays in 
tum. 
Chapter 1 
Labor Market Discrimination as a Competitive 
Device: The Case of Local Television News 
Local television news does not seem to fit the mold 
that we economists have cast for customer discrimination. 
As Gary Becker (1957) first demonstrated, the racial 
preferences of customers can directly affect the marginal 
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revenue product of labor of different groups and, hence, 
labor market outcomes. But if, as is frequently suggested, 
consumers prefer not to interact with minority employees, 
then why do we see so many blacks, Asians, and 
Hispanics on the local news? In 2002 an average of 21 
percent of broadcast news employees at local television 
stations were minorities versus 12 percent of newspaper 
journalists and 8 percent of radio broadcast employees 
(Robert Paper 2003; American Society of Newspaper 
Editors [ASNE] 2003). Given the frequent supposition 
of prejudice against minorities, it seems strange at 
first glance that minorities have greater representation 
in the more visible media. Might it be the case that 
customers actually have a preference for diversity in some 
circumstances? Or are other factors at play here? 
Casual observations of diversity are not the only 
source of interest in the market for local television 
news. IdentifYing the presence and extent of customer 
discrimination is not an easy task; it requires either 
directly or indirectly finding a way to measure the 
preferences of different labor market agents and how 
these attitudes affect labor market outcomes. As a result, 
most studies of customer discrimination have focused on 
professional sports, where worker output and customer 
demand are easily observable. The evidence from these 
studies has varied considerably with the particular sport, 
time period, and type of position examined. Gwartney 
and Haworth (1974) find that black players increased 
attendance at baseball games in the 1950s; Sommers and 
Quinton (1982) find that blacks had an insignificant effect 
on baseball tearn revenue in the 1970s; and Nardinelli 
and Simon (1990) find that baseball cards picturing 
minority players sell for less than those of white players. 
Studies of basketball have tended to find evidence of 
discrimination (e.g., Kahn and Sherer 1988; Burdekin and 
Idson 1991; Kanazawa and Funk 200 I) with the exception 
of trading cards for players from the 1970s (Stone 
and Warren 1999). Looking at football quarterbacks, 
Arcidiacono et al. (2004) find evidence of customer 
tastes for diversity. The disparities in the empirical 
literature could indicate that the degree and magnitude 
of customer discrimination is affected by the visibility of 
employees and the racial composition of customers and/or 
employees. Recent studies of markets in which a large 
percentage of employees are black tend to find evidence 
of discrimination, while studies in which blacks are not 
as prevalent or as visible are less likely to find evidence 
of discrimination. Finally, none of these studies, which 
all rely on sports markets and firms with little direct 
competition, have allowed for the consideration that firms 
may choose to differentiate along the lines of employee 
characteristics as a competitive device. 
Television news presents another window into 
customer discrimination, both because employees are 
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visible to customers and because it offers a measure 
of customer preferences through television ratings. In 
this paper, I use a combination of Nielsen ratings for 
November 2003 broadcasts of local television news in 
25 U.S. cities and self-collected data on the demographic 
characteristics of on-air personalities. Because there is 
evidence of sorting among stations within a market, with 
some having a much larger number of minorities on their 
newscasts than others, I present a theory demonstrating 
that customer discrimination can cause intramarket 
segregation in which firms select their racial compositions 
to cater to certain groups of customers. This theory relies 
on one adjustment to the assumptions of the classic 
Becker model of customer discrimination: I assume that 
customers interact with more than one employee at a finn 
and that they care about the overall racial composition of 
the firm. With this rather modest change, it is relatively 
simple to view the composition of employees as yet 
another dimension along which firms might choose to 
differentiate, and with most formulation ofthe costs and 
benefits of differentiation, I obtain a Nash equilibrium in 
which finns are indeed predicted to use discrimination as 
a competitive device. 
Looking at the data on local television news, I find 
first that there is a strong negative correlation between 
the racial, age, and gender composition of competing 
stations. Furthermore, because of the notoriously 
large labor pool of television journalists, this negative 
correlation is unlikely to be attributable to supply factors. 
As further evidence that firms have some flexibility in the 
racial characteristics of their hires, I show that changes 
in Equal Employee Opportunity enforcement regimes 
explain some, but far from all, of the differences in station 
compositions. 
Turning to the question of demand, if firms are 
indeed using employee composition as a means of 
differentiation, then the response of viewers to small 
changes in composition should be different for the 
different firms. Indeed, this prediction holds in a rather 
striking way. Consider the case of black employees. If a 
straightforward customer taste for discrimination holds, 
then ratings should either rise or fall with the addition 
of black newscasters. If there is instead a nonlinear taste 
for diversity, then ratings should rise as blacks are added 
until the customer "bliss point" is reached, at which time 
ratings should fall. However, I find a very different result 
from the two possibilities that have previously been 
considered. Figure I presents market/time-slot fixed-
effect estimates of mean Nielsen rating as a function of 
the match between a station's black composition and the 
market's black composition. The variable black match 
is constructed so that a match of less than 100 indicates 
that a station has fewer blacks relative to the market in 
which it broadcasts and a match of over 100 indicates 
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Figure 1 Impact of Station/City Black Match on 
Nielsen Rating 
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that the station overrepresents blacks relative to the 
market. Strikingly, stations with few blacks see a decline 
in ratings as they add black employees, while for a wide 
range of stations with an overrepresentation of blacks, 
we see that ratings rise as they add blacks. I go on to 
show similar results for gender and age composition 
but obtain predictions for Asians and Hispanics that 
are more consistent with a customer taste for diversity. 
These findings suggest another layer of complexity 
to consider with the basic Becker model of customer 
discrimination. Local news stations appear to respond 
to the racial composition of their competitors and try to 
differentiate themselves by race, age, and sex of their 
on-air employees. For three of the five groups examined, 
the ratings regressions indicate that the response of 
consumers varies with the racial composition of the firms 
in a manner consistent with the predictions of this model 
of racial differentiation. Viewers of the more "white" 
stations have a stronger negative reaction to an increase in 
blacks than do viewers of the "black" stations, suggesting 
that stations with few blacks cater to consumers with 
a high discrimination coefficient against blacks, while 
stations with more blacks cater to customers who are less 
prejudiced or who prefer blacks. Similarly, viewers of 
stations with more females and older employees have a 
smaller negative response to these groups than viewers 
of stations with lower concentrations. While the results 
for Hispanics and Asians suggest a customer preference 
for diversity rather than differentiation or strict racial 
preferences as originally modeled in the literature, it 
seems likely that the exclusion of foreign language local 
news has biased the estimates. Taken as a whole, the 
results here suggest that customer discrimination may be 
a more complex phenomenon than we have previously 
considered. This added complexity, moreover, suggests 
that we need to rethink the welfare implications of 
customer discrimination and the heretofore accepted fact 
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that customer discrimination would always produce wage 
differentials that would not be eliminated by competition. 
Chapter 2 
Discrimination and Neighborhood Effects: 
Understanding Racial Differentials in U.S. 
Housing Prices 
(Published in the Journal of Urban Economics, 
September 2004) 
Research on racial housing price differentials has 
yielded vastly different results ranging from indications 
in the early literature that black households pay premiums 
for housing to estimates of significant discounts in the 
more recent literature. This decline and reversal of the 
differential might be due to a reduction in discriminatory 
practices over the past 40 years. However, differences 
in estimation techniques and data sets may also explain 
some, perhaps all, of the perceived decline. 
The key to identifying the results of discrimination is 
to ask whether blacks and whites pay different amounts 
for identical housing. This requires controlling not 
only for characteristics of the house itself, but also 
for characteristics of the surrounding neighborhood. 
Controlling for neighborhood effects is important for two 
reasons. First, as described in this essay, economic theory 
predicts that discrimination can produce price differentials 
within a neighborhood, while prejudice and segregation 
produce price differentials between neighborhoods. Thus, 
if neighborhood characteristics are not controlled for, 
these forces will be confused and it will be impossible to 
separate the causes of an observed racial price differential. 
Second, evidence suggests that black neighborhoods 
tend to have relatively higher crime rates, lower wealth, 
poorer provision of public goods, and other negative 
characteristics. Since being black is correlated with living 
in a black neighborhood, a researcher who does not 
control for neighborhood characteristics may find that 
blacks tend to pay less for housing than do whites. Such 
a result would be biased by neighborhood quality and 
would not reliably indicate the presence or absence of 
discrimination. 
In relatively recent studies, such as Chambers (1992) 
and Kiel and Zabel (1996), researchers have typically 
used large national data sets and, if they controlled for 
neighborhood characteristics at all, have used census 
tracts or larger areas as neighborhood proxies. Census 
tracts, the smallest areas that have been used, have 
between 1,500 and 8,000 inhabitants, with an optimum 
given by the census bureau of 4,000 inhabitants. Given 
that the Census Bureau reports that the average number 
of people per household in the United States was 2.62 
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in 2000, a census tract with 4,000 inhabitants would 
represent about 1,527 houses, or about 100 city blocks 
of 15 houses each. Although the Census Bureau intends 
them to be proxies for neighborhoods, it seems likely 
that there is still substantial variation within tracts with 
such a large number of houses. The results of studies 
using these proxies indicate that blacks receive price 
discounts relative to whites. However, since neighborhood 
racial composition and other amenities may have been 
insufficiently controlled for, this negative finding could 
be due to the tendency of blacks to live in lower-priced 
black neighborhoods rather than due to the absence of 
discriminatory behavior of suppliers. 
This essay attempts to remedy this problem by 
controlling for neighborhoods at a much smaller level 
than that of census tracts. The 1985, 1989, and 1993 
national American Housing Surveys (AHS) contain 
a special "neighbors sample" that is composed of 
sub-sampled "kernel" housing units and observations 
about the 10 nearest neighbors of each. Using these 
data, I control for the racial composition, educational 
attainment, income levels, and other characteristics of 
neighborhoods defined by relatively small areas that 
should be more homogenous than census tracts. By using 
information about the composition of the neighbor group 
surrounding each household, I hope to more thoroughly 
control for neighborhood effects, and thus be able to 
separate any racial price differential into portions that are 
I) due to neighborhood effects, and 2) due to supplier 
discrimination. I also deviate from previous studies, 
which have used only cross-sectional techniques and take 
advantage of the time-series characteristics of the AHS. 
I use these data first to demonstrate that adding 
measures of neighborhood characteristics dramatically 
lowers the magnitude of the negative coefficient on 
householder race, suggesting that unobserved variable 
bias has indeed been a factor in finding little evidence of 
discrimination in recent years. However, even with more 
thorough neighborhood controls than has previously been 
possible, Hausman specification tests still indicate that 
unobserved variable bias is a problem. For this reason, I 
utilize the time-series nature of the data by implementing 
address-specific fixed effects. These estimates indicate 
that blacks pay approximately 10 percent more than 
whites for identical housing in identical neighborhoods, 
providing evidence of supplier discrimination. Although 
this coefficient becomes significant only at the 10 percent 
level, it is measuring how values changed for a given 
house when the race of the occupants changed, holding 
constant the remaining neighborhood racial composition, 
which is exactly what we wish to capture to separate 
neighborhood composition from discrimination. This 
offers evidence that supplier price discrimination may 
still be a force in the ownership market but that it has not 
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been reliably captured in previous studies because of bias 
caused by omitted neighborhood effects. 
The estimates also provide evidence that prejudice 
causes house prices to fan as the percentage of blacks 
in a neighborhood increases. Looking at this effect 
in three types of neighborhoods~those that start off 
predominantly white, integrated, and predominantly 
black~1 find evidence of declining house prices in all 
three as the percentage of blacks rises. The coefficient 
on racial composition in integrated neighborhoods is 
negative, but with ap-value of 0.107 is insignificant. 
However, the estimates indicate that a 10-percentage-
point increase in the percent of neighborhood 
residents who are black lowers house values in black 
neighborhoods by an average of 4.8 percent and 
lowers values in white neighborhoods by an average 
of 7.1 percent. This significant difference indicates 
that the impact of racial composition is larger in white 
neighborhoods than in black neighborhoods. 
These results are noteworthy because, for the first time 
in over two decades, we've had data that allow for the 
separation of neighborhood effects from discrimination 
effects which in turn has provided evidence that 
discrimination does continue to playa role in U.S. 
housing markets. 
Chapter 3 
A Cure for Discrimination? Affirmative Action 
and the Case of California Proposition 209 
(Revised and resubmitted to Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review, summer 2006) 
Introducing and removing affirmative action are not 
opposite sides of the same coin. Proponents of affirmative 
action maintain that it will provide a long-term cure for 
discrimination by allowing victims to demonstrate their 
skill and worth, thus changing prejudicial attitudes. Under 
this scenario, if affirmative action "works," then when it 
is time to drop the program there will be no deleterious 
effects for minorities. Opponents of these controversial 
programs, however, argue that it does not address the 
root source of inequality and, moreover, that it may 
create labor market inefficiencies and result in reverse 
discrimination against white males. Both sides, therefore, 
suggest that an effective affirmative action program would 
cause minority employment to rise, but they disagree on 
whether this increase is efficient and whether it would be 
sustainable if formal affirmative action were ended. 
To date, there has been little opportunity to measure 
the impact of removing affirmative action programs. 
While federal support for enforcement has ebbed and 
flowed, and Supreme Court rulings in the past decade 
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have chipped away at affirmative action, it is difficult to 
say whether concurrent changes in minority outcomes 
were due to affirmative action policy or other trends in 
inequality. A similar problem plagued attempts to measure 
the impact of instituting affirmative action in earlier 
years. While minorities and women made gains in the 
labor market in the 1970s and 1980s, it is not clear what 
portion of this was due to affinnative action and what 
was the result of other influences. Empirical studies of the 
impact of affirmative action on labor markets have relied 
on differences in outcomes for government contractors, 
who are subject to the program, and noncontractors, who 
are not. While these studies have provided evidence of 
minority gains among contracting firms, the results could 
be biased because contractor status is not exogenous: 
firms with the lowest cost of meeting affirmative action 
requirements may be more likely to be contractors. Hence, 
we are left with an incomplete picture of both the impact 
of a controversial program and the potential consequences 
of its removal. What is needed is a control group to which 
we can compare changes in outcomes for those affected 
by affirmative action. 
The enactment of California Proposition 209 provides 
just such an opportunity. The measure, passed in the 
1996 state elections and made effective in November 
of 1997, essentially outlawed existing local and state 
affirmative action programs in education, public hiring, 
and contracting, unless superseded by federal law. This 
change in state policy presents a natural experiment 
for measuring the labor market impact of removing of 
affirmative action programs. I use Current Population 
Survey (CPS) data to compare outcomes for minorities 
in California before and after affirmative action was 
removed to those same outcomes for white males. Then, 
to control for national trends in minority differentials, 
I compare this difference to the difference for a control 
group: states not undergoing similar changes in the law. 
The use of this triple difference technique to analyze the 
impact of removing affirmative action on employment, 
unemployment, labor force participation, and wages 
provides evidence on the long-term effects of affirmative 
action. 
The triple difference estimates in this analysis rely 
on three divisions of the data. First, the observations are 
categorized as before or after the enactment of proposition 
209 (e.g., 1995 or 1999, 1995 or 2000, and so on, 
depending on the years being used). Second, individuals 
are divided into eight mutually exclusive and collectively 
exhaustive categories: white males, white females, 
black males, black females, other males, other females, 
Hispanic males, and Hispanic females. And third, the 
country is divided into two groups: an experimental state 
(California) and the remaining control states or "nation." I 
use probits to examine the impact of removing affirmative 
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programs on labor force status and linear regression 
models to look at the impact on wages. In the case of 
the former, I am careful in correctly calculating and 
interpreting the average marginal effects for a nonlinear 
model, which is frequently and incorrectly done by simply 
calculating the marginal effect of the coefficient on the 
triple interaction tenn. 
Looking at labor force status, the estimates indicate 
that between 1995 and 1999 the relative employment 
of all minorities fell by 2.8 percentage points while 
nonparticipation rose by 2.9 percentage points. Similarly, 
between 1995 and 2000 relative employment fell by 1.8 
percentage points (but the change is not significant), 
and nonparticipation rose by 2.2 percentage points; 
between 1995 and 2001 relative employment fell by 2.2 
percentage points while non participation rose by 2.0 
percentage points. Breaking this down by group, between 
1995 and 1999 relative nonparticipation rose by 2.9 
percentage points for white females, 4.6 percentage points 
for black females, 1.4 percentage points for Hispanic 
males, 5.2 percentage points for Hispanic females, and 
6.8 percentage points for other males. This increase in 
nonparticipation accounts for nearly all of the decline in 
employment for all groups except black females, who 
also saw a drop in unemployment. Only black males and 
other females do not exhibit significant changes in labor 
force status between 1995 and 1999. By 200 1, however, 
there appears to have been a rise in nonparticipation for 
all minority groups except for black men, who show a 
significant fall in nonparticipation. That there is little 
evidence of negative impact on black men is in keeping 
with previous findings (e.g., Holzer and Neumark 2000) 
that in later years affirmative action had a greater impact 
on women, but it should also be noted that the sample of 
black males in California in smaller than any of the other 
minority groups. 
As a whole, the results suggest that Proposition 209 
moved females and minorities out of the labor force. If, 
as the results indicate, the removal of affinnative action 
made it more difficult for women and minorities to find 
work, then this exit from the labor force is not surprising. 
Previous work has tended to indicate that women have 
more elastic labor supplies than men and that they tend 
to be more responsive along the extensive participation 
margin (Blau 2005) In addition, when looking at the 
impact of minimum wage legislation, Mincer (1976) finds 
that affected groups tend to leave the labor force and, 
moreover, that females and minorities have relatively 
high participation elasticities. Furthennore, these 
estimates look at the impact of Proposition 209 a year 
and more after its implementation. It may be the case 
that these groups did initially move from employment to 
unemployment but that by 1999 they became discouraged 
and left the labor force. 
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Turning from labor force status to wages, there is no 
clear prediction of the impact ofrernoving affinnative 
action on wages. Relative wage changes will depend on 
the nature of preexisting discrimination, the effectiveness 
of affirmative action, and the relative skill levels of the 
groups affected by its removal. It is thus not surprising 
that, as a whole, the results do not show a consistent effect 
for any of the groups. This could indicate that affirmative 
action had little effect on wages. Affirmative action 
laws, after all, did not directly address wage equality, 
which was covered by equal employment law. It could 
also be the result of skill selection among those leaving 
employment. Since the wage regressions are conditional 
on employment, the wages of those who remain employed 
could rise because they are relatively more skilled or fall 
because they are relatively less skilled than those who 
left. 
Because the removal of state-sponsored affinnative 
action in California appears to have the greatest impact 
on labor force participation, I then consider alternative 
explanations for the observed fall in participation-
changes in school enrollment patterns, immigration 
policy, child care policy, incarceration rates, and welfare 
reform. I show that each in turn does not appear likely to 
have produced the observed effect. 
Given that this large decline in minority labor-market 
participation in California seems to be due to the removal 
of extensive state affinnative action programs, this result 
raises doubts about their efficacy to begin with. The drop 
in participation is consistent with one of three hypotheses 
from the theoretical literature: 1) that affirmative action 
is inefficient and creates reverse discrimination, 2) that 
affinnative action is ineffective at engendering pennanent 
change in prejudices that create labor market inequality, 
or 3) that the sources of inequality are not prejudice-
based. A final possibility is that California's affirmative 
action programs had not been in place long enough to 
engender pennanent alteration in inequality. However, 
given that California had pursued affirmative action for 
over a generation, this may be equally discouraging. 
Note 
All the references can be found in the original dissertation. 
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